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Aligning the financial system with the real economy is necessary for society to address
urgent sustainability challenges, including the climate crisis and economic inequality. Connecting
the financial system and the real economy requires the alignment of financial policy and regulation
with sustainability objectives and frameworks, along with the consideration of market structure.
The aim of this study is to understand the policy frameworks and important structural variables—
fund concentration, number and types of actors, and relative market power—specifically for
private retirement systems in Australia, the UK and the US. 1 Private retirement systems are among
the largest pools of long-term capital globally, and the three selected countries are those with most
total assets. By reviewing policy and structure, we sought to better understand the behaviour of
various actors, their key challenges, retirement systems functioning, and the ability of the system
to align with sustainability objectives (for example human rights or net-zero policy commitments).
We therefore define retirement system sustainability as the ability of plan boards and managers to
be responsible investors, active stewards, and allocators of capital to economic activities with
desirable social and environmental outcomes. Systemic sustainability issues such as the climate
crisis and economic inequality hold the potential for environmental and economic destruction,
devastation of livelihoods, and political upheaval and conflict with clear negative implications for
global financial markets. Pension fund members face risk both of a financial nature and in relation
to quality of life in retirement. In order to tackle these issues, we need to redirect capital flows and
ensure that assets are stewarded to align economic activities with science-based thresholds and
commitments. Pension systems should be designed to fulfil a central part of this sustainability
realignment in the interest of their members.
In recent years, there has been an upsurge in Environmental, Social, and Governance
(ESG), climate, and sustainable policies (PRI 2021) and related regulations (Eskander et al. 2021).
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These policies have not only grown in numbers, but they are also becoming increasingly detailed.
For example, the European Union (EU) Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) has
recently introduced requirements for financial service firms (at both entity and product-level) to
document, on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, how they consider sustainability risks in their
investment decision-making and how their decisions influence sustainability factors. The SFDR
(2019) includes a reference to the EU Taxonomy Regulation, requiring financial institutions to
document the extent to which they use the taxonomy to determine the sustainability of their
products and the degree to which they are aligned. The taxonomy sets performance thresholds for
specific economic activities to determine the extent to which they make a substantial contribution
to environmental objectives within the EU while avoiding significant harm to other environmental
objectives (PRI 2020a). Other major capital markets such as Canada, China, and the UK have
already developed, or are in the process of developing, similar taxonomies. Such policy
frameworks designed to deliver both sustainability objectives—such as net-zero emissions—and
market stability by aiming to redirect capital to sustainable economic activities and promote active
stewardship of asset owners (e.g., pension funds), although it is not clear whether and when
retirement system designs serve as obstacles or accelerators of these policies.
Policy frameworks vary across the three jurisdictions examined. The design of
conventional retirement and pension policy has implications for the sustainability of private
retirement systems. Whether it is policymakers encouraging fund consolidation, tightening of
solvency requirements, automatic enrolment legislation, or measures to protect consumers and
savers from excessive costs, policy instruments influence asset pools, as well as governance and
investment activities regarding sustainability. Currently, the US retirement system is generally
subject to a more market-led approach, whereas Australian and UK policymakers have played a
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more active role. UK policymakers have been particularly proactive, recently introducing new
requirements for consideration of ESG factors by retirement plans, including stewardship.
Australian policymakers have been the most forceful in driving fund consolidation in the private
retirement system. However, they have not put sustainability at the core of policymaking.
Our research gathers quantitative and qualitative data from various national pension and
retirement authorities, consultants, think tanks, and investment industry organisations; reviews
related literature, policy, and regulatory documents; and includes interviews with experts and
practitioners across the three countries. We identify three key issues: 1) market fragmentation,
which tends to undermine the responsible investment support and activities among retirement
plans; 2) the increasing importance of fund managers and investment consultants, along with their
limited responsible investment incentives; and 3) the growth in personal pensions systems which
have tended to lack emphasis on sustainability.
Our research shows, first, that public sector retirement plans generally benefit more from
economies of scale. Larger plans with greater assets under management generally tend to have
more market power (i.e., ability to influence services and products in the market), stronger
governance, and, in some cases, internal investment expertise. As the degree of cross-sectional
ownership of the economy—through diversified, global and long-term portfolios—is higher, large
asset owners have an increased interest in reducing market risk and externalities presented by
sustainability challenges to improve financial performance overall. In its most developed form,
this is commonly referred to as universal ownership. From a system perspective, if we use PRI
membership 2 as a proxy, our findings suggest that when the number of asset owners with scale in
the system is low, the system-wide consideration of sustainability challenges is also low. At the
same time, we find that other segments of the retirement system with very high fragmentation in
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terms of assets, often showcase potential shortcomings such as weak governance, insufficient
investment expertise and resources, investment chain complexity, and principal-agent issues.
Overall, fragmented systems face the greatest challenges in developing sustainable investment
practices.
Second, we show that the weight of capital and influence of actors in private retirement
systems has shifted away from institutional asset owners undertaking investment strategy, asset
allocation, and manager selection on behalf of beneficiaries, towards financial service providers,
who have assigned responsibility to individuals to determine their own investment strategies. As
a consequence, we find that most retirement plans rely heavily on the fund management and
investment consulting industries in the formulation and execution of their investment strategies.
Both industries are dominated by a relatively small number of firms with significant asset
concentration. Accordingly, while their market power and resources could, in theory, imply that
that they would be best situated to drive responsible investment and stewardship, in practice their
lack of incentives results in limited execution.
Last, we examine personal pension savings which currently total $12 trillion, the fastest
growing segments of the three countries examined. Here we find that individual savers are faced
with complex choices that they are generally ill-equipped to make, and therefore they must often
rely on independent financial advisers where cost, a more comprehensible metric than value or
quality, is often the focus. For this reason, sustainability is often not considered, despite increasing
interest. We also find the data in personal pension markets to be insufficient to draw a complete
picture in terms of market share and product uptake. While the general lack of transparency limits
the insights we generate on firms and products, we conclude that the structural challenges and lack
of market focus hinder sustainability in this large and growing market.

5

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first discuss our methodology and
data collection process. Next, we report main findings focusing on market fragmentation, the role
of service providers, and principal-agent conflicts in personal pensions. A final section concludes.

Prior Related Literature
Our research is broadly related to the emerging literature on sustainable finance. To date,
prior work has documented a range of institutional investor specific responsible investment (RI)
developments, including ESG investment allocation (Gibson & Krueger 2018; Gibson et al. 2021),
proxy voting (Bolton et al. 2020; He et al. 2020), and engagement (Dimson et al. 2015; Dimson et
al. 2020; Hoepner et al. 2021). In addition, there is a growing understanding that client interest in
these issues is on the upswing as well (Hartzmark & Sussman 2019; Bauer & Smeets forthcoming;
Riedl & Smeets 2017). Nevertheless, we have identified very few studies that concentrate on
pension system structures specifically and the institutional investors therein. While there are useful
broader analyses (OECD 2017, 2020), we have not found related literature examining how
jurisdictional characteristics influence the ESG integration practices of these institutional actors,
or whether client interests are served differentially across these jurisdictions. This is most likely
due to data limitations, as few datasets exist that enable analysis of client demand and jurisdictional
characteristics by design. We therefore complement the literature by adopting a mixed-methods
approach to examining these gaps and opportunities for research.

Methodology and Data
The first phase of this research focused on obtaining and analysing data on retirement plans,
assets and members from various national pension and retirement authorities, pension and
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investment consultants, think tanks, pension trade press as well as investment industry
organisations. Sources reviewed included the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, the
Productivity Commission, the Royal Commission, the Responsible Investment Association
Australasia, QMV and the Financial Services Council in Australia; The Pension Regulator, the
Financial Conduct Authority, the Department of Workers and Pensions, ShareAction and the
Pension Protection Fund in the UK; Influence Map, the Employee Benefit Research Institute, the
Employee Benefits Security Administration, the Investment Company Institute, the Milliman
Corporate Pension Funding Study and Callan in the US; and global sources such as Willis Tower
Watson’s Global Pension Assets study and the 500 Largest Asset Managers study, the Melbourne
Mercer Global Pension Index, and the PRI signatory database (see Appendix Table A1 for
additional details on these sources).
We furthermore reviewed academic literature and policy and regulatory documents and
conducted interviews with a range of experts and practitioners. To validate the research, we also
sought input from selected pension experts and academics on each of the markets examined. These
included leading thinkers with decades of experience in pension policy and practice from
governments, academia, think tanks, and industry, across the three countries examined. Our
findings reflect the feedback received and verify many of our generated insights.

Main Findings
It is important to recognise the idiosyncratic characteristics of the retirement systems
examined. Each system is a construction of different policies and various features—defined
contributions (DC) and/or defined benefit (DB), single-employer and/or multi-employer or
industry, public and/or private sector, for-profit and/or not-for-profit—and while many of the
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building blocks are the same, the unique combination of these policies and features makes
quantitative comparison challenging. We are aware of these analytical constraints and therefore
complement the quantitative methods with qualitative assessment and comparative commentary.
Market Fragmentation. In this sub-section, we examine the role of market fragmentation for
private retirement system sustainability. We collected and analyzed 2019 data from national
retirement and pension agencies, regulators, and industry associations, and we find that there is
significant variation in asset fragmentation levels both across countries as well as within pension
systems. In Table 1, we show, that the scale in terms of assets (indicated through average plan
size) of public and industry retirement plans such as not-for-profit superannuation funds in
Australia (average size of $12bn), local government pension schemes (LGPS) in the UK ($22.5bn),
and public defined benefit (DB) plans in the US ($35bn) exhibit significantly more scale in terms
of assets than other segments such as US 401(k) plans ($0.01bn), private sector DB plans in the
US ($.07bn) and in the UK ($0.39bn), and workplace DC trust schemes in the UK ($0.05bn).
Unsurprisingly, the private sector segments (both DB and DC), which are often single-employer
plans, are quite fragmented parts of the systems in asset terms, meaning that these segments include
a very high number of plans (e.g., there are 560,000 401(k) plans in the US), many of which are
small. By using PRI membership as a proxy for support of responsible investment, we find that
the most fragmented segments of each national retirement system have the lowest PRI coverage
in asset terms: 401(k) plans (<1%) and private sector DB plans (0%) in the US, and private sector
DB and DC plans in the UK (18%). 3 This suggests that fragmented segments have very low levels
of support for responsible investment.
Table 1 here
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Over time, the weight of capital and influence of actors in private retirement systems has
shifted away from institutional asset owners that undertake investment strategy, asset allocation,
and manager selection, on behalf of beneficiaries. Increasingly, influence has shifted towards
financial service providers, who have assigned responsibility to individuals to determine their own
investment strategies. In the US, this is indicated by total asset size and 5-year compound annual
growth rate (CAGR) figures for Independent Retirement Accounts (IRAs) (total assets equal
$11trn and 5-year CAGR is 8.6%), and 401(k) plans ($6.2trn and 7.1%). The story in Australia is
somewhat different, with not-for-profit superannuation funds being the dominating type of pension
provision with $895bn in total assets and 5-year CAGR at 11.7 percent. Nonetheless, self-managed
superannuation funds, the personal pension vehicle in Australia, amount to more than 25 percent
of total retirement system assets. In the UK, the picture is less clear, with LGPS only accounting
for $450bn in total assets but a high 5-year CAGR of 9.8 percent, private sector workplace DB
plans are the largest segment accounting for more than $2trn and 5-year CAGR of 7.7 percent.
Data are not available to calculate 5-year CAGR for either workplace DC contract schemes or
personal pensions.
In essence, we find significant asset fragmentation within the three retirement systems.
This is most noticeable in private sector segments, as indicated by average plan sizes above.
Generally speaking, small plans tend to be less engaged with sustainable investment as indicated
by PRI membership figures. In Table 2, we see the results at the national retirement system level.
The UK and US systems, both of which include large, fragmented private sector, single-employer
segments, have considerably lower PRI membership ratios than Australia. Additionally, if we
include the personal pension assets in the equation, where IRAs in the US make up the largest
share (36.7% of total US retirement assets), the contrast is even more stark. This complements a
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previous finding that larger plans are generally more engaged with sustainable investment (PRI,
2019).
Table 2 here
As Table 2 shows, DB remains a large share of private retirement pools, accounting for
$17.4 trillion in assets across the three nations examined here. In the UK and US, many private
sector DB plans are already closed to new members (88% and 25% in the UK and US,
respectively), and more plans are now closed to new accruals (41% and 12% respectively) (PRI
2020b). With the notable exception of a small number of UK private sector workplace DB plans,
there has been limited leadership on sustainability in the DB segment as indicated by the PRI
membership ratios. We also find that with sponsors and trustees focused on liabilities and derisking, sustainability has become even less of a priority. Therefore, in the absence of regulatory
intervention or determined action by trustees and sponsors, private workplace DB plans are
unlikely to be major providers of new sustainable capital going forward.
The governance set-up of private sector workplace DB plans also reveals some challenges.
Sponsors in the UK and US routinely establish governing bodies that take on responsibility for
managing and administering the plans. In the UK, the governing body is comprised of independent
trustees required to act impartially and in members’ best interests. In the US, the equivalent is a
plan fiduciary, who is typically a corporate officer. The trustee/fiduciary is the ultimate steward of
the assets and of beneficiaries’ interests. The sponsor remains ultimately responsible for making
up any shortfall in the plan’s funding, so it has a continuing interest in the investment strategy. In
the UK, trustees have the final say on investments, but in the US, given the dual role of fiduciaries
and potential absence of impartiality, the lines are less clear. Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate the
differences between the two models and reveal a complex structure of advisors (actuaries and
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consultants), administrators, and asset managers in both countries. Overall, the structure and
governance setup leave private sector DB plans with limited influence on the complex
intermediation chain, i.e. as Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, the investment chain has multiple entities
involved in both investment strategy and execution.
Figures 1 and 2 here
The picture is similar for US 401(k) plans where there is also a relatively long chain of
intermediaries—as shown in Figure 3—between the ultimate owner of the invested assets of a
401(k) plan—the employee—and the actual investment decision. Plan sponsors are ultimately
responsible for the design and operation of the plan. They usually use third-party trustees and
recordkeepers for day-to-day operations, relying on external advisers in choosing the provider and
determining the investment line-up. As plan participants are increasingly enrolled into a default
option, termed in the US a Qualified Default Investment Alternative (QDIA), the selection of the
default asset manager—and, where the QDIA is a Target Date Fund or a balanced fund, that
manager’s selection of underlying instruments—will be the primary determinant of how DC assets
are invested. 4 As our interviews indicated, this complex intermediation chain increases the risk of
beneficiary or plan preferences on sustainability not being expressed in investment decisions or
proxy voting behavior. It is also important to note that the current language of the US Labor
Department’s Employee Benefits Security Administration’s (EBSA) 2018 Field Assistance
Bulletin leaves fiduciaries reluctant to deviate from peers to avoid litigation risk. Overall,
regulatory signals, structural barriers, and governance challenges leave 401(k) plans with limited
scope to address sustainability issues.
Figure 3 here
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The Role of Service Providers. To examine the role of service providers in private retirement
system sustainability, we review data from P&I The Largest Money Managers (US, May 2019),
IPE (UK, August 2019), Australian Managed Funds Industry, FSC/Morningstar (July 2016), PRI
signatory database (April 2020), and Willis Towers Watson The World’s Largest 500 Asset
Managers (2019); see Appendix Table A1. We find that there is considerable asset concentration
among the largest asset managers in all three countries. Thus, Table 3 shows that the top 10 asset
managers in Australia hold 50 percent of externally managed retirement assets. In the US, the top
10 asset managers for DB funds account for more than 20 percent of externally managed assets
and more than 50 percent for DC assets. Lastly, in the UK, the top three asset managers hold more
than 70 percent of externally managed retirement assets. This is important since fragmented
retirement systems leave more authority in the hands of service providers, including investment
managers and consultants.
Table 3 here
In situations where retirement plans use external managers to run segregated mandates on
their behalf, plan sponsors can retain a high degree of control over both the shape of the portfolio
and the opportunities for engagement associated with these investments. However, retirement
plans that invest through pooled funds are usually unable to exercise their ownership rights, and
many of the bigger asset managers have poor track records on proxy voting and other aspects of
stewardship. Recent research has found that the three biggest passive asset managers globally have
stewardship budgets that are only 0.2 percent of the estimated fees they earn from managing equity
assets, and that there is no real incentive for them to dedicate more resources to stewardship
activities (Bebchuk and Hirst 2019). In addition to limited stewardship activities, there is also
evidence on poor voting records on sustainability issues, and significant variation between the
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largest asset managers (InfluenceMap 2019; ShareAction 2019). In a private retirement system
where the majority of savers increasingly invest through passive funds, this is becoming a major
concern. Notably, Australian super funds—which have more actively managed investments—are
insourcing a growing proportion of their asset management, while at the same time, they are
increasingly adopting sustainable investment activities and undertaking stewardship of their assets.
A few larger plans in the UK and US—mainly public plans—with internal investment teams and
sufficient resources are also adopting this model. While this potentially addresses the sustainability
shortcomings of service providers for sizable public plans, such an option may not be available to
smaller retirement plans lacking internal investment expertise.
Australia, the UK, and the US represent more than half of the total private retirement assets
globally. Given that all three markets rely heavily on the fund management industry, the practices
of the largest firms are vital determinants of the sustainability practices of private retirement
systems. The investment consultant market is similarly dominated by a small number of firms. For
instance, in the US, the top 10 consulting firms account for 80 percent of institutional, tax-exempt
assets under advice ($24 trillion) and the top 20 for over 90 percent. In the UK, two firms (Mercer
and Aon/WTW) 5 have an estimated combined market share of 40 percent. In Australia, four
consulting firms dominate the industry. In essence, a few international firms hold significant
market shares and therefore they can exert influence on the extent to which retirement plans
consider sustainability issues.
Moreover, investment consultants are instrumental in determining the degree of
sustainability embedded in the investment strategies of the retirement plans they advise (PRI
2017a). They provide a range of advisory services ranging from funding, to asset allocation,
manager selection, platform recommendations, fund options, and reporting processes. They
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frequently train sponsors and trustees on approaches to investment and emerging investment
trends, and they are generally a recognised source of authority and knowledge. The influence of
consultants is especially marked in the OCIO and fiduciary management markets, which are
relatively small but are the fastest-growing areas for consulting services. Therefore, investment
consultants are already key actors in facilitating the sustainability of private retirement systems,
and their continued expansion in services will only further emphasise their importance.
We also note that the UK Competition and Market Authority found that, although
retirement plans accounted for 90 percent of consultants’ revenues, most trustees did not engage
with them. In addition, consultants usually do not include new investment strategies in their watch
lists until these have built a three-year track record, and we have learned that there are still
relatively few sustainable investment funds that meet this threshold. This has been a particular
barrier for the adoption of new TDFs focusing on sustainability by US 401(k) plans. The
investment consulting sector—despite pockets of excellence—has also generally failed to
incorporate ESG considerations into standard advice templates (PRI 2017b). The market power,
resources and influence of asset managers, investment consultants, and other service providers
imply that they are often better placed than retirement plan sponsors to drive responsible
investment and stewardship, yet to date there are few incentives to do so. Overall, their lack of
incentives in practice—which are driven mainly by offering low-cost products and services in
competitive markets—lead to limited execution. We find that legal and regulatory frameworks
focused on reducing costs—for example, the UK charge cap and class action suits in the US—are
important measures to protect savers from high costs and fees in fragmented retirement systems.
Nevertheless, they are also very likely to contribute to the lack of incentives on sustainability. We
find this to be a key structural challenge, which may undermine long-term system sustainability.
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Principal-Agent Conflicts in Personal Pensions. Next, we examine the role of principal-agent
conflicts in personal pensions and how it contributes to private retirement system sustainability.
To this end, we again examine the 2019 data from national retirement and pension agencies,
regulators and industry associations cited previously. Nevertheless, there are limited data available
on service providers, market shares, and investment products, which makes it difficult to judge
some aspects of the market. Personal pensions constitute a large and growing share of private
retirement systems in all three countries. In Table 1, we showed that IRAs in the US account for
36.7 percent of total US retirement system assets. In Australia, self-managed super funds account
for 25.5 percent, and personal pension assets in the UK account for 17 percent.
We conclude that individual savers in personal pensions tend not to have the same level of
access to portfolio data as do institutional clients. Furthermore, many lack the time and resources
to digest and analyse vast amounts of information, and large numbers will be insufficiently
educated to make complex financial decisions. As a result, many rely on their independent
financial advisers (IFAs), which is a fragmented market consisting of thousands of firms. In
addition, current regulatory regimes raise concerns over levels of consumer protection. For
example, most IFAs in the US are not fiduciaries and operate under a lesser ‘suitability’ standard.
Personal pension savers are product-takers—to an even higher extent than 401(k) plans—with
little leverage relative to service providers from the concentrated fund management industry.
Consequently, participants are disengaged from the process of choosing their product, provider,
and investments. Cost, which is often a more comprehensible metric than value or quality, is often
the focus guiding peoples’ decisions. For this reason, sustainability is often not considered as an
asset feature, so providers have limited commercial incentives to introduce and promote new
sustainable products and services. As a result, more than $12 trillion of personal pension savings
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are being managed across three countries with minimal stewardship and consideration of
sustainability issues.

Conclusions and Implications
The aim of this study was to understand the policy frameworks and important structural
variables—fund concentration, number and types of actors, and relative market power—within the
private retirement systems in Australia, the UK, and the US. By reviewing policy and structure,
we sought to better understand the behaviour of various actors, their key challenges, how
retirement systems function, and their ability to align with sustainability objectives. We also
identified key challenges for specific national retirement systems and analysed comparative
aspects in relation to policy and regulation, structure, governance, and the role of service providers.
This, in turn, afforded us with new insights into how, or whether, specific system designs facilitate
sustainable investments.
We identified three key issues: 1) the issue of market fragmentation, which tends to
undermine the responsible investment support and activities among retirement plans; 2) the
increasing importance of fund managers and investment consultants, along with their limited
sustainable investment incentives; and 3) the growth and lack of a sustainability emphasis in
personal pension systems.
While regulators in many parts of the world seek more sophisticated policies to align the
financial system and economies with sustainability objectives, we conclude that one should not
overlook the need to devote equal attention to retirement system structure, in ways to align these
with sustainability policies. Furthermore, policymakers should consider fund consolidation in
private sector retirement systems. The presence of well-governed, influential retirement plans with
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cross-sectoral ownership of the economy and a universal ownership outlook and their relative
weight in the financial system is key to counter collective action problems and drive how systemic
sustainability issues are addressed by other actors. Fund consolidation may be achieved, for
example, by raising the professional standards of trustees and fiduciaries or through introduction
of new ESG-related obligations on pension funds (such as Taskforce for Climate-related Financial
Disclosure by UK pension funds). Given the right regulatory options, as we’ve seen with UK
master trusts and the Australian superannuation structure, this forces smaller pension funds (often
single employer) which do not comply with new standards to consider letting assets being absorbed
under available multi-employer alternatives. Fortunately, the emergence of environmental
taxonomies will provide us with information about the extent to which various retirement plans
perform relative to national goals. This has the potential to further our understanding on the
relationship between structure, governance and sustainability performance and thereby better
refine our policy recommendations in the future.
We also find room for concern, in that smaller retirement plans are less likely to consider
responsible investment practices, while commercial service providers lack incentives to deviate
from the ‘norm.’ Policymakers should therefore consider whether service-provider incentives
should be aligned with sustainability incentives. Our findings also emphasize that it remains an
open question as to whether beneficiary sustainability interests are truly being met and serviced.
We therefore suggest that policymakers could do much to boost transparency in these markets,
helping generate better-informed policies and provide beneficiaries with information relevant to
their savings choices.
There remains much more to do to improve our understanding by analysing how ESG is
being integrated and adopted across the board. In the future, it would be useful to study the proxy
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voting behaviour of various actors including retirement plans (public and private), providers of
personal pension products, and third-party managers. In a similar spirit, analysing ‘sustainable’
capital flows at the aggregate level would be useful as well. Furthermore, we identified other future
research opportunities in personal pension markets including investigating asset concentration,
market shares by various actors and sustainable product uptake. Lastly, our study concentrated on
identifying structural characteristics of three main jurisdictions. We suggest that additional major
retirement systems in terms of assets be analyzed, including Canada, Denmark, Japan, the
Netherlands, and Sweden, as they are likely to face different structural challenges. By analysing
these, we will better understand the common, comparable, and unique pension system challenges
globally.
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Endnotes
1

We use the OECD term ‘private retirement system’ which includes retirement plans and pension

schemes that are not part of the social security or other statutory pension programme administered
by the government—private pension schemes and retirement plans may be administered directly
by an employer acting as the plan sponsor, by a private sector pension provider or other financial
institution.
2

PRI membership is a commitment to implement the six principles, including ESG

incorporation, active ownership, and the annual public disclosure of information to document
progress; this also entails a requirement to meet certain minimum requirements related to
governance and implementation.
3

Data from the UK pension authorities do not allow the separation of DB and DC trust-based

workplace assets to determine PRI signatory coverage.
4

Most new members of private sector workplace DC plans are automatically enrolled into the

default option, which is likely to be a Target Date Fund (TDF) or other balanced strategy; 21% of
401(k) assets are in TDFs, rising to 49% of the assets of recently hired participants in their 20s.
5

A planned merger between the two firms was announced in 2020.
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Figure 1. US private DB plan governance and investment decision-making chain
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Note: Sponsors of private DB plans in the US routinely establish governing bodies that take on
responsibility for managing and administering the plans. The governing body is comprised of plan
fiduciaries who typically are corporate officers. The fiduciaries are the ultimate stewards of the
assets and of beneficiaries’ interests. The sponsor remains ultimately responsible for making up
any shortfall in the plan’s funding, so it has a continuing interest in the investment strategy. This
dual role of fiduciaries and potential absence of impartiality influences the governance model. The
figure also reveals a complex structure of advisors (actuaries and consultants), administrators, and
asset managers. The investment chain has multiple entities involved in both investment strategy
and execution and the structure and governance setup leave US private sector DB plans with
limited influence on the complex intermediation chain.
Source: PRI (2020b).
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Figure 2. UK private DB plan governance and investment decision-making chain
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Note: Sponsors in of private DB retirement plans in the UK routinely establish governing bodies
that take on responsibility for managing and administering the plans. The governing body is
comprised of independent trustees required to act impartially and in members’ best interests.
Trustees are the ultimate stewards of the assets and of beneficiaries’ interests. The sponsor remains
ultimately responsible for making up any shortfall in the plan’s funding, so it has a continuing
interest in the investment strategy. Trustees have the final say on investments. The investment
chain has multiple entities involved in both investment strategy and execution, and the structure
and governance setup leave private sector DB plans in the UK with limited influence on the
complex intermediation chain.
Source: PRI (2020b).
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Figure 3. US DC plan governance and investment decision-making chain
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Note: The value chain of US 401(k) plans also includes a long chain of intermediaries between the ultimate owner of the invested assets
of a 401(k) plan—the employee—and the actual investment decision. Plan sponsors are ultimately responsible for the design and
operation of the plan. They usually use third-party trustees and recordkeepers for day-to-day operations, relying on external advisers in
choosing the provider and determining the investment line-up. As plan participants are increasingly enrolled into a default option, termed
in the US a QDIA, the selection of the default asset manager—and, where the QDIA is a Target Date Fund or a balanced fund, that
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manager’s selection of underlying instruments—will be the primary determinant of how DC assets are invested. The complex
intermediation chain increases the risk of beneficiary or plan preferences on sustainability not being expressed it investment decisions
or proxy voting behaviour.
Source: PRI (2020b).
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Table 1. Asset concentration, growth trends, and PRI coverage within workplace retirement and
personal pension systems
Assets
$bn

# plans

US independent retirement accounts 11,025

N/A

Average 5-year
plan size CAGR
($bn)
N/A
8.6%

PRI
signatory
base
n/a

US public employees DB

6,730

190

35.42

5.3%

27%

US 401(k)

6,200

560,00

0.01

7.1%

<1%

US private sector workplace DB

3,380

46,500

0.07

2.4%

0%

UK private sector workplace DB

2,125

5,500

0.39

7.7%

18%*

Australia not-for-profit super funds

895

74

12.09

11.7%

75%

UK personal pensions

620

N/A

N/A

N/A

n/a

Australia self-managed super funds

515

N/A

N/A

5.1%

n/a

UK local government pension 450
schemes
Australia retail super funds
430

20

22.50

9.8%

66%

112

3.84

3.1%

45%

UK workplace DC contract

240

12**

19.58

N/A

N/A

UK workplace DC trust

95

2,000

0.05

17.9%***

18%*

* UK data does not allow the separation of DB and DC trust-based workplace assets.
** 12 private pension providers cover more than 2,000 company schemes.
*** Excludes micro schemes.
Note: Personal pensions—such as independent retirement accounts and self-managed super funds
—exhibit relatively high 5-year compound annual growth rates (CAGR) and are highly
fragmented. The public sector retirement assets are significantly more concentrated across the
three countries than private sector retirement assets with the exception of the UK workplace DC
contract segment (this is due to a distinct feature of asset pooling of company schemes).
Fragmented segments of retirement systems—i.e., exhibiting lower average plan size in asset
terms—are less engaged on responsible investment than segments with concentration of assets
using PRI membership as an indicator. Membership of the PRI entails a commitment to implement
six principles, including ESG incorporation, active ownership, and the annual public disclosure of
information to document progress; this also includes a requirement to meet certain minimum
requirements related to governance and implementation. There are no institutional entities in the
personal pension system eligible for PRI asset owner membership.
Sources: APRA, UK LGPS, TPR, FCA, EBSA, Investment Company Institute. All data (rounded)
are from 2019.
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Table 2. Country-by-country overview of private retirement assets, PRI coverage and DB/DC shares
Total
private
retirement
assets
($bn)
Australia 1,945
UK
US

3,650
27,570

Workplace
retirement
assets
($bn)

Personal
pension
assets
($bn)

1,430

515

Approximate
Approximate
workplace
total
PRI
PRI
signatory
signatory
coverage
coverage
47.1%
64%

3,030
17,860

620
9,720

19.5%
8.1%

23.5%
12.5%

DB as %
of
total
workplace
assets

DC as %
of
total
workplace
assets

14%

86%

70%
53%

30%
47%

Exchange rates used: $1= A$1.45, $1= £0.76
Note: The US private retirement system with a total of more than $27trn in assets dwarfs those of Australia ($1.95trn) and the UK
($3.65trn). The PRI’s signatory base covers nearly 50% of the assets in the Australian retirement system and over 60% of workplace
retirement savings. In the UK, the figures are 19.5% and 23.5% respectively. In the US, PRI signatories hold only 8% of system assets
and 13% of workplace retirement assets. Just over half of the total workplace assets across these three countries are held in DB plans.
The general trend from DB to DC is all but complete in Australia, with only a handful of super funds offering purely DB plans and is
gathering pace in the UK and the US. In both the UK and the US, public sector workplace retirement provision remains primarily DB.
The private retirement systems include retirement plans and pension schemes that are not part of the social security or other statutory
pension programme administered by the government. This can either be: 1) workplace plans which are linked to an employment
or professional relationship between the plan member and the plan sponsor and are established by employers or groups thereof (e.g.
industry associations) and labour or professional associations, jointly or separately, or 2) personal pensions which are established and
administered directly by a pension fund or other financial institution without intervention by employers and where individuals
independently purchase and select material aspects of the arrangements while employers may make contributions.
Sources: APRA, TPR, FCA; ICI, PRI signatory database. All data (rounded) are from 2019.
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Table 3. Asset concentration of outsourced private retirement assets by top asset management
firms per country
Market concentration of externally Largest asset managers
managed retirement assets
Australia Top 10 asset managers > 50% of assets State Street Global Advisors
AMP Group
Commonwealth/Colonial Group
Vanguard
IFM Investors
Macquarie Bank Group
BlackRock
Schroder Investment Management
UBS Asset Management
BT Investment Management
UK
Top 3 asset managers > 70% of assets Legal and General Investment Management
Insight
Blackrock
US
Top 10 asset managers for DB have
PIMCO
NISA Investment*
>20% of assets
BNY Mellon*
DB
Goldman Sachs Group
Legg Mason*
BlackRock
State Street Global Advisors
Prudential Financial
Both
Top 10 asset managers for DC have
JP Morgan AM
Northern Trust
>50% of assets
Vanguard
Fidelity Investment
Nuveen
DC
T Rowe Price
Capital Group

* Not PRI signatories

Note: The asset management industry‘s assets under management have continued to rise steadily
over the past ten years, with US firms leading the pack. US asset managers also have the largest
market share across the three private retirement systems examined. In Australia the 10 largest asset
managers hold more than 50% of outsourced retirement assets. The UK retirement asset
management market is extremely concentrated, with the top three providers managing over 70%
of total outsourced assets under management. In the US, the top 10 asset managers for DB plans
are responsible for over 20% of outsourced DB assets and the top 10 managers for DC plans for
nearly 50% of outsourced DC assets.
Sources: P&I The Largest Money Managers (2019), IPE (2019), Australian Managed Funds
industry, FSC/Morningstar (2016), PRI signatory database (2020).
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Appendix
Table A1. Sources for country-by-country retirement system analysis
Australia
•

Australian Prudential
Regulation Authority

•

Productivity
Commission

•

Royal Commission into
Misconduct in the
Banking,
Superannuation and
Financial Services
Industry

•

Responsible Investment
Association Australasia

Sources
APRA - Annual Superannuation Bulletin (2019)
APRA - Annual Fund-Level Superannuation Statistics (2019)
APRA - Quarterly Superannuation Performance Statistics
(September, 2019)
APRA - Climate change: Awareness to action (2019)
PC - Superannuation: Assessing Efficiency
Competitiveness, Inquiry Report, No. 91 (2018)

and

RC - Background Paper 25: Legal framework governing
aspects of the Australian Superannuation System (2018)
RIAA - Responsible Investment Benchmark Report (2019)

•

Financial Services
Council

•

Financial Services
Council/ Morningstar

FSC - State of the industry report (2019)

•

The Pension Regulator

TPR - DC trust: scheme return data 2019 (2020)

•

Financial Conduct
Authority

TPR - Automatic enrolment – Commentary and analysis:
April 2018-March 2019 (2019)

•

Department of Workers
and Pensions

FCA - Consultation on proposed amendment
of COBS 21.3 permitted links rules (2018)

•

ShareAction/UNISON

FCA - Independent Governance Committees: extension of
remit. FCA Policy Statement PS19/30 (2019)

•

ShareAction

RIAA - Responsible Investment Super Study (2019)

FSC/Morningstar – Australian Managed Funds Industry
(2016)

UK

FCA - Effective competition in non-workplace pensions
(2019)
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•

Competition and Market
Authority

•

Willis Tower Watson

•

The Investment
Association

•

Pension Protection Fund

•

IPE

•

Local Government
Pension Schemes

FCA - Patient Capital and Authorised Funds, Discussion
Paper DP18/10 (2018)
DWP - Investment Innovation and Future Consolidation: A
Consultation on the Consideration of Illiquid Assets and the
Development of Scale in Occupational Defined Contribution
schemes (2019)
DWP - The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment and
Disclosure) (Amendment) Regulations (2019)
ShareAction/UNISON - Responsible Investment in LGPS –
Research and review of the
pension fund’s investment strategy statements (England and
Wales) (2019)
ShareAction - Is regulation enough? A review of UK master
trusts’ ESG policies (2019)
ShareAction - Voting Matters (2019)
CMA - Investment Consultants Market Investigation (2018)
WTW - FTSE 350 DC Pension Survey (2019)
IA - Investment Association Annual Survey (2018)
PPF - Purple Book (2019)
IPE - The UK’s biggest asset managers (2019)
LGPS - Local government pension scheme (2020)

US
•

Employee Benefit
Research Institute

EBRI - Putting Numbers to the Shifting Retirement
Landscape, Fast Facts (2020)

•

Employee Benefits
Security Administration

EBRI - EBRI Issue Brief no. 456: IRA Balances,
Contributions, Rollovers, Withdrawals, and Asset Allocation,
2016 Update (2018)

•

Investment Company
Institute

EBSA - Private Pension Plan Bulletin, Public Plans Database
(2018)
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•

The
BrightScope/Investment
Company Institute

•

Milliman

•

Callan

•

Influence Map

•

Pensions & Investments

ICI - ICI Research Perspective, Vol. 25 No. 10 (December
2019)
ICI - ICI Quarterly Retirement Market Data (Second Quarter
2019)
ICI - ICI Research Perspective, Vol. 24 No. 10 (December
2018)
The BrightScope/Investment Company Institute - Defined
Contribution Plan Profile: A Close Look at 401(k) Plans
(2016)
Milliman - Corporate Pension Funding Study (2019)
Callan - DC Trends Survey (2019)
Influence Map - Asset Managers and Climate Change – How
the sector performs on portfolios, engagement and resolutions
(2019)
P&I - The Largest Money Managers (2019)

Global
•

Willis Tower Watson

WTW - Global Pension Assets Study (2020)

•

Mercer

WTW - The world’s largest 500 fund managers (2019)
Mercer - Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index (2019)

•

PRI

PRI - Signatory database - internal database of signatory
organisations and their assets under management based on
annually reported information

